Multi-Factor Authentication
Qpher supports multi-factor authentication (MFA) in Qpher Console and in the Qpher Vault app. MFA reduces the blast radius of a compromised password: even if a password leaks, an attacker still needs the second factor to sign in or to perform a sensitive action.
This page is a posture overview for enterprise administrators evaluating Qpher. For the user-facing enrollment steps, see Account & Settings. For the API surface, see API Reference — Authentication.
What MFA Protects
MFA raises the cost of two realistic attacks:
- Credential stuffing — reused passwords from unrelated breaches are the most common account-takeover vector. A second factor makes a stolen password insufficient by itself.
- Session hijack escalation — even with a live session, Qpher requires a second proof of presence (step-up re-verification) before the actions listed under Step-Up Re-Verification.
MFA does not replace our other controls. Tenant isolation, the fail-closed Policy Engine, and encrypted-at-rest private keys remain in effect regardless of authentication state. See Threat Model.
Supported Factors
- TOTP (RFC 6238) — 6-digit code from any compatible authenticator app (Google Authenticator, 1Password, Authy, Microsoft Authenticator). No SMS.
- Recovery codes — 10 single-use codes issued at enrollment. You can regenerate the set from Qpher Console or Qpher Vault; regenerating invalidates all previously issued codes.
- Email OTP (fallback only) — a 6-digit code delivered to the account email. Only offered after two failed primary-factor attempts on the same login challenge, and never listed as a primary option. This closes the support hole when a user loses both their authenticator device and recovery codes.
SMS-based OTP is deliberately not supported — NIST SP 800-63B restricts its use and SIM-swap is the standard bypass. Qpher does not offer passkeys or other phishing-resistant factors today.
Step-Up Re-Verification
Sensitive actions require a second proof of presence taken immediately before the action — even inside an already-authenticated session. A short-lived token is issued after the step-up check and consumed on the action request.
The following actions require step-up today:
| Action | Surface |
|---|---|
| Subscription checkout or cancel | Console |
| Rotate an API key | Console |
| Remove a team member | Console + Vault admin |
| Change password | Console |
| Rotate a PQC key (KMS) | Console |
| Delete your Qpher Console account | Console |
| Delete or restore an organization | Console |
What a user sees: a dialog asks for the TOTP code (if MFA is enabled) or the current password (if MFA is not enabled) before the action succeeds. The step-up token is single-use and lasts five minutes; if the user cancels, no state changes.
Step-up applies to human sessions (Portal JWT). API-key integrations and SDK
clients never receive a step-up prompt or an ERR_MFA_013 response.
API keys are already the highest-trust credential; adding a second factor at
the API-key tier does not meaningfully change the threat model.
Organization Policy (every paid plan)
An organization owner or admin on a paid plan can require MFA for every member, once the organization has a Vault team:
- Each member has a grace period — 7 days by default — counted from when the requirement was turned on, or from when the member's account was created, whichever is later.
- After the grace period, members who have not enrolled must enroll before they can continue, in Qpher Console and in the Qpher Vault app.
- Turning the requirement on or off is written to the audit log.
One setting drives enforcement in Qpher Console and in the Qpher Vault app for members of the same organization.
Cross-Product Behavior
Qpher runs two deliberately separate account systems — a Qpher Console account (organizations, billing, API keys) and a Qpher Vault account (the iPhone app, personal encrypted storage). The same email can hold both accounts; MFA state is tracked independently on each. A user enrolled on one product is not automatically enrolled on the other.
The exception is organization membership: if an organization requires MFA, the requirement also applies to its members in the Qpher Vault app.
Threat Model (brief)
| Threat | MFA impact |
|---|---|
| Password reuse / credential stuffing | Blocked by TOTP factor |
| Phishing of a password | Blocked unless attacker also controls the authenticator |
| Session-cookie theft that bypasses login | Partially mitigated — any sensitive action still requires step-up |
| SIM swap | Not applicable — no SMS OTP |
| Phishing of a TOTP code in real time | Reduced by single-use step-up and short token TTL; Qpher does not offer phishing-resistant factors (passkeys / WebAuthn) today |
| Device loss with recovery codes lost | Email OTP fallback — only after two primary failures on the same challenge |
For the full threat model, see Threat Model.
Audit and Observability
Every enrollment, verification, failure, recovery-code use, regeneration, and disable emits a persistent audit event. On every paid plan, events recorded for your organization appear in its audit log — see Audit Logging.
Standards Alignment
- NIST SP 800-63B — TOTP is a permitted authenticator type; SMS is not used.
Learn More
- Account & Settings — enrollment steps in the Vault iOS app.
- API Reference — Authentication — how to obtain and use a step-up token programmatically.
- Zero Trust — how authorization is evaluated on every request.
- Threat Model — the full list of threats and how each is addressed.